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TO THE MEMORY 
OF MSGR. MAURICE DIONNE 
Duane H. BERQUST 
"One man is to me as the thousand If he be the best·· 
(Heraclitus. DK49). 
T HE DEATH of Monsignor Maurice Dionne the 14th of May 1980 was the sad 
occasion for his disciples to reflect upon the distinctive character of his 
teaching and the example ofhis life. Our filial piety, our gratitude and our love oblige 
us to acknowledge the great debt which we owe him for his teaching and his example. 
Principle certainly among the distinctive traits of this great philosopher were his love 
for, and his understanding of, reason. These two traits were inseparably bound 
together in Monsignor's life, for a mature love of reason (as his certainly was) must 
be determined by a clear understanding of its exigencies when ordered to knowing 
truth. Such a love is in no way blind to the weaknesses nor to the defects of reason ; 
rather, it zealously seeks to know ail those things which are necessary to the 
inteIlectual life and which assure its weIl-being. Such an understanding of reason can 
only lead, as it did in the case of Monsignor Dionne, to an ever more profound and 
intense love of man's supreme faculty. 
Indeed, almost the who1e of the master's teaching and research could be divided 
according as it touched upon one or the other of the needs of reason in its pursuit of 
truth. His courses not only pointed out these needs and indicated how they were to be 
met, they effectively met them. Moreover, our own increasing awareness of these 
needs, through the able guidance of Monsignor, made us aIl more acutely conscious 
of their neglect throughout the history of philosophy, and very especially in our own 
times, a neglect which has led to so many tragic consequences. 
Among the many needs of theoretical (or "looking") reason, we can name here but a 
few of those which Monsignor treated in his courses over the years. These might 
conveniently be divided into those of reason considered by itself (along with the sense 
powers), those of reason in relation to sense appetite (emotions) and will, and those 
of reason in relation to the teacher. This division does involve sorne material overlap, 
however. 
Two considerations stand out especially in the teaching of Monsignor Dionne on the 
needs of theoretical reason considered by itself. The first ot these is paideia, which is 
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necessary both in regard to the principles of the thing under consideration and in 
regard to the method or way of proceeding. As to the second of these, we are 
indebted to Monsignor for the explicit division of the three ways of pro cee ding of 
theoretical reason, their order, and their necessity. The need for logic, as one ofthese 
ways, and its relation to the other ways, was brought out in this context. Indeed, to 
logic as the common method of the sciences Monsignor devoted many courses, 
emphasizing especially its nature, and how it ought to be taught. In addition, there 
were many particular considerations bearing on the principal tools of reason. 
Another very important aspect of his consideration of the intellectual life was his 
insistance, through the years, on the necessity of the liberal arts as a preparation for 
philosophy. 
Because the use of reason depends upon the appetite (both will and emotions) in 
various ways, Monsignor devoted much time and thought to the needs oftheoretical 
reason in comparison to the appetite. He brought out c1early the need of a complete 
rectification of the appetite in regard to knowing. 
His recognition of our need ta be taught by the great masters led him to investigate 
the consequent need for two kinds of disposition to learn: One of these in the will, 
and the other in the intellect. He showed also the indispensable rôle played by the 
prooemium in a philosophical treatise, tying this in equally with the disposition to 
learn on the part of the intellect. 
Another point for which his students will remember him was his development of the 
notion of manuductio, or the need of reason to be 1ed, so to say, by the hand, either 
pel' modum naturae, or pel' modum voluntatis or pel' modum rationis. Especially 
important was his emphasis on the neglect of this last kind of manuductio in those 
difficult sciences of logic and metaphysics, and his teaching on the sort of 
manuductio required for them. 
Finally, running through the warp and woof of ail the above as a constant theme was 
the insistance upon the necessity of beginning weil, for the beginning determines aIl 
that follows. 
What we have said here is but some slight indication of Monsignor Dionne 's concern 
with the needs of reason in its pursuit of knowledge. He made us, who had the good 
fortune of studying under him, aware of these needs. Whatever success we have had 
in meeting those needs has been with the help of the inspiration and direction he 
gave us. 
When we consider the vigorous seeds of knowledge which he planted in our minds 
and the many pitfalls which he helped us to avoid, we are constrained to say with 
Antony, "When comes such another?" 
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